Ian Ravenscroft Philosophy Of Mind: A Beginners Guide for Students and Teachers
Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide by Ian Ravenscroft A Review
Philosophy of mind is one of the most fascinating and challenging areas of philosophy. It deals with questions such as: What are mental states? How do they relate to physical states? How do they affect our actions and behavior? How do they explain our experiences and knowledge? How do they differ from those of other animals or machines?
Ian Ravenscroft Philosophy Of Mind, A Beginners Guide.pdfl
These questions have been debated for centuries by philosophers, scientists, psychologists, and theologians. They have also inspired many works of fiction, art, and film. However, they are not easy to answer. They require careful analysis, clear definitions, logical arguments, and empirical evidence.
One way to approach these questions is to read a good introductory textbook on philosophy of mind. There are many such books available, but one that stands out for its clarity, comprehensiveness, and accessibility is Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide by Ian Ravenscroft.
Ian Ravenscroft is a lecturer in philosophy at Flinders University in Australia. He has published several papers on philosophy of mind, especially on connectionism and mental causation. He has also co-authored a book on folk psychology with Martin Davies.
In his book, Ravenscroft aims to provide a balanced and engaging introduction to the main topics and theories in philosophy of mind. He covers both historical and contemporary perspectives, as well as some interdisciplinary connections with cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, and artificial intelligence. He also provides helpful summaries, guides to further reading, and questions at the end of each chapter.
In this review, I will briefly outline the main topics and arguments covered in the book, and then evaluate its strengths and weaknesses. I will also suggest some further reading for those who want to explore the subject in more depth.
What are mental states?
The first part of the book deals with one of the most fundamental questions in philosophy of mind: What are mental states? Ravenscroft considers four major types of theories that attempt to answer this question: dualism, behaviorism, the identity theory, and functionalism. He also discusses some alternative views, such as eliminativism and fictionalism.
Dualism
Dualism is the view that mental states are distinct from physical states. There are two main forms of dualism: substance dualism and property dualism.
Substance dualism
Substance dualism is the view that there are two kinds of substances in the world: physical substances and mental substances. Physical substances are things like atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies. Mental substances are things like souls, spirits, or minds. According to substance dualism, mental states are states of mental substances, and physical states are states of physical substances.
The most famous advocate of substance dualism was René Descartes, a 17th-century French philosopher and mathematician. Descartes argued that he could doubt the existence of his body and the physical world, but he could not doubt the existence of his mind and his thoughts. Therefore, he concluded that his mind was a different kind of substance from his body.
Ravenscroft presents some arguments in favor of substance dualism, such as the argument from introspection, the argument from indiscernibility, and the argument from free will. He also presents some arguments against substance dualism, such as the argument from simplicity, the argument from interaction, and the argument from evolution.
Property dualism
Property dualism is the view that there are two kinds of properties in the world: physical properties and mental properties. Physical properties are things like mass, charge, shape, color, and temperature. Mental properties are things like pain, pleasure, belief, desire, and consciousness. According to property dualism, mental states are states that have mental properties, and physical states are states that have physical properties.
One version of property dualism is epiphenomenalism, which holds that mental properties are caused by physical properties, but do not cause anything themselves. For example, a brain state may cause a pain state, but a pain state does not cause any behavior or action. Epiphenomenalism tries to avoid the problem of interaction that plagues substance dualism, but it faces other problems, such as explaining why we have mental properties at all.
Ravenscroft presents some arguments in favor of epiphenomenalism, such as the argument from qualia, the argument from introspection, and the argument from knowledge. He also presents some arguments against epiphenomenalism, such as the argument from evolution, the argument from common sense, and the argument from introspective causation.
Behaviorism
Behaviorism is the view that mental states are nothing but behaviors or dispositions to behave. There are two main forms of behaviorism: philosophical behaviorism and methodological behaviorism.
Philosophical behaviorism
Philosophical behaviorism is the view that mental states are identical to behaviors or dispositions to behave. For example, to be in pain is to exhibit certain pain behaviors or to be disposed to exhibit them. According to philosophical behaviorism, there is nothing more to being in pain than behaving or being ready to behave in certain ways.
The main motivation for philosophical behaviorism was to avoid the problems of dualism and to provide a scientific account of mental phenomena. Philosophical behaviorists argued that mental terms could be defined or translated into behavioral terms, and that mental statements could be verified or falsified by observing behavior.
Ravenscroft presents some arguments in favor of philosophical behaviorism, such as the argument from verification, the argument from simplicity, and the argument from privacy. He also presents some arguments against philosophical behaviorism such as the argument from multiple realizability the argument from qualia and the argument from logical behaviorism
Methodological behaviorism
Methodological behaviorism is the view that mental states are not identical to behaviors or dispositions to behave but rather that they should be explained or predicted by reference to behaviors or dispositions to behave For example to be in pain is not to exhibit certain pain behaviors or to be disposed to exhibit them but rather to have a state that causes or is caused by certain pain behaviors or dispositions According to methodological behaviorism, mental states are not identical to behaviors or dispositions to behave, but rather that they should be explained or predicted by reference to behaviors or dispositions to behave. For example, to be in pain is not to exhibit certain pain behaviors or to be disposed to exhibit them, but rather to have a state that causes or is caused by certain pain behaviors or dispositions. Methodological behaviorism is a normative theory about the scientific conduct of psychology. It claims that psychology should concern itself with the behavior of organisms (human and nonhuman animals), and not with mental states or events or with constructing internal information processing accounts of behavior . The main motivation for methodological behaviorism was to avoid the metaphysical and epistemological problems of dualism and the identity theory, and to provide a more empirical and pragmatic approach to psychology. Methodological behaviorists argued that mental terms could be operationalized or measured by behavioral criteria, and that mental hypotheses could be tested by behavioral experiments. Ravenscroft presents some arguments for methodological behaviorism, such as the argument from parsimony, the argument from operationalism, and the argument from pragmatism. He also presents some arguments against methodological behaviorism, such as the argument from multiple realizability, the argument from qualia, and the argument from cognitive psychology. The identity theory
The identity theory is the view that mental states are identical to physical states. More specifically, it is the view that mental states are identical to brain states. For example, to be in pain is to have a certain state of one's brain. According to the identity theory, there is nothing more to being in pain than having that brain state.
The main motivation for the identity theory was to avoid the problems of dualism and behaviorism, and to provide a more naturalistic and scientific account of mental phenomena. Identity theorists argued that mental terms could be reduced or eliminated by physical terms, and that mental statements could be verified or falsified by neuroscientific evidence.
Ravenscroft presents some arguments in favor of the identity theory, such as the argument from simplicity, the argument from causation, and the argument from deficit studies. He also presents some arguments against the identity theory such as the argument from multiple realizability the argument from qualia and the argument from modal intuitions
Reductive and nonreductive physicalism
Reductive physicalism is the view that mental states are not only identical to physical states but also reducible or explainable by physical laws and theories For example to be in pain is not only to have a certain state of one's brain but also to have a state that can be fully accounted for by neuroscience According to reductive physicalism there is nothing more to being in pain than having that brain state and its physical properties Nonreductive physicalism is the view that mental states are identical to physical states but not reducible or explainable by physical laws and theories For example to be in pain is to have a certain state of one's brain but also to have a state that has some irreducible or emergent properties that are not captured by neuroscience According to nonreductive physicalism there is something more to being in pain than having that brain state and its physical properties Ravenscroft presents some arguments in favor of nonreductive physicalism such as the argument from multiple realizability the argument from autonomy and the argument from normativity He also presents some arguments against nonreductive physicalism such as the argument from causal exclusion the argument from explanatory gap and the argument from supervenience
Functionalism
Functionalism is the view that mental states are defined by their causal roles or functions in a system. For example, to be in pain is to have a state that is caused by certain stimuli (such as tissue damage), that causes certain effects (such as distress and avoidance), and that interacts with other states (such as beliefs and desires). According to functionalism, there is nothing more to being in pain than having a state that plays that causal role or function.
The main motivation for functionalism was to avoid the problems of dualism, behaviorism, and the identity theory, and to provide a more flexible and general account of mental phenomena. Functionalists argued that mental terms could be analyzed or defined by functional terms, and that mental statements could be verified or falsified by functional tests.
Ravenscroft presents some arguments in favor of functionalism, such as the argument from multiple realizability, the argument from artificial intelligence, and the argument from common sense. He also presents some arguments against functionalism, such as the argument from qualia, the argument from inverted spectrum, and the argument from absent qualia.
The computational theory of mind
The computational theory of mind is the view that mental states are computational states of a system. More specifically, it is the view that mental states are syntactic states of a system that can be manipulated by rules or algorithms. For example, to have a belief is to have a state that has a certain syntactic structure and that can be processed by certain rules or algorithms. According to the computational theory of mind, there is nothing more to having a belief than having a state that plays that syntactic role or function.
The main motivation for the computational theory of mind was to provide a more precise and rigorous version of functionalism, and to explain how mental states can represent or have meaning. Computationalists argued that mental terms could be formalized or modeled by computational terms, and that mental statements could be verified or falsified by computational experiments.
Ravenscroft presents some arguments in favor of the computational theory of mind, such as the argument from Turing machines, the argument from the language of thought, and the argument from cognitive science. He also presents some arguments against the computational theory of mind, such as the argument from syntax and semantics, the argument from intentionality, and the argument from the Chinese room.
The language of thought
The language of thought is the view that mental states are sentences or symbols in a mental language that is innate and universal. For example, to have a belief is to have a sentence or symbol in one's mind that expresses that belief. According to the language of thought, there is nothing more to having a belief than having a sentence or symbol in one's mind.
The main motivation for the language of thought was to provide a more detailed and systematic version of the computational theory of mind, and to explain how mental states can have structure and compositionality. Language-of-thought theorists argued that mental terms could be translated or mapped onto sentences or symbols in a mental language, and that mental statements could be verified or falsified by logical analysis.
Ravenscroft presents some arguments in favor of the language of thought, such as the argument from productivity, the argument from systematicity, and the argument from rationality. He also presents some arguments against the language of thought such as the argument from learnability the argument from variability and the argument from connectionism
Connectionism
Connectionism is the view that mental states are patterns of activation in a network of simple units. More specifically, it is the view that mental states are distributed representations in a network of artificial neurons that can be trained by learning algorithms. For example, to have a belief is to have a pattern of activation in one's network that represents that belief. According to connectionism, there is nothing more to having a belief than having a pattern of activation in one's network.
The main motivation for connectionism was to provide a more realistic and dynamic version of functionalism, and to explain how mental states can have similarity and generalization. Connectionists argued that mental terms could be simulated or implemented by patterns of activation in a network, and that mental statements could be verified or falsified by neural experiments.
Ravenscroft presents some arguments in favor of connectionism such as the argument from neurobiology the argument from learning and the argument from parallel processing He also presents some arguments against connectionism such as the argument from rationality the argument from language and the argument from systematicity
Eliminativism and fictionalism
Eliminativism is the view that mental states do not exist at all. More specifically, it is the view that our ordinary concepts and terms for mental states (such as beliefs, desires, emotions, etc.) are false or meaningless, and that they should be eliminated or replaced by more scientific concepts and terms (such as brain states, neural processes, behavioral dispositions, etc.). For example, to say that someone has a belief is to say something false or nonsensical. According to eliminativism, there is nothing at all to having a belief.
Fictionalism is the view that mental states do not exist literally but only figuratively. More specifically, it is the view that our ordinary concepts and terms for mental states are useful fictions or metaphors, and that they should be treated as such rather than as literal descriptions or explanations. For example, to say that 71b2f0854b
